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Causes and Beginnings in the Kalam Argument: 
Reply to Craig 
Wes Morriston 
Defenders of the kalam cosmological argument claim that everything that 
begins to exist must have a cause. But what if there were no time prior to 
the beginning of the universe? Would the beginning universe still have to 
have a cause? In his reply to an earlier paper of mine, William Lane Craig 
defends an affirmative answer. Every beginning, he believes - even the 
very first event in the history of time - must have a cause. It makes no dif-
ference, he says, whether an event is embedded within time or whether it 
coincides with the beginning of time - in either case a cause is necessary. In 
the present paper, I clarify and defend my case for taking the opposite 
view. I take a close look at the most important lines of argument in Craig's 
rejoinder, and conclude that his position is supported neither by a trustwor-
thy a priori intuition nor by a sound empirical generalization. 
Ordinary causes emerge only within the context of a pre-existent natural 
order. So if the beginning of the universe is (also) the Beginning of nature 
itself, then it is impossible for it to have an ordinary cause. This much 
would be presumably be accepted by all parties to the present dispute. 
But why suppose that the Beginning of all beginnings must have any 
cause at all? If the class of things that "begin to exist" is understood to 
include time and the whole natural order, why believe the first premise of 
the kalam argument? 
(PI) Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence. 
In his rejoinder to my paperl, William Lane Craig strongly defends the 
view that PI is metaphysically necessary, that it is supported by a synthetic a 
priori intuition, and that there is overwhelming empirical evidence for it. 
Limitations of space make it impossible to respond to all of Craig's points; 
so I shall restrict my attention to the most important issues, beginning with 
Craig's claim that PI is a metaphysical necessity backed by a synthetic a 
priori intuition." 
1. Intuition, metaphysical necessity, and the need for analysis 
In his rejoinder, Craig stresses the point that metaphysical possibility 
and conceptual possibility are distinct, and that our ability consistently to 
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conceive or imagine a world in which things spring into existence 
uncaused does not prove that such things are metaphysically possible. 
Craig is right about this. But I never claimed that we could settle the issue 
about PI merely by imagining a world in which things pop into existence 
without causes. What I did claim was: first, that such thought experiments 
constitute some (defeasible) evidence for the metaphysical possibility of 
uncaused beginnings; and second, that a careful examination of any "intu-
ition" that conflicts with this evidence is called for. I also proposed some 
criteria to help us sort things out' - none of which are helpful to Craig's 
contention. In this connection, I claimed that Craig's own analysis of 
"beginning to exist" makes it much less clear that PI is true. 
In response to this last point, Craig suggests that the analysis of the con-
cept of "beginning to exist" is irrelevant to the perspicuity of the intuition 
that PI is metaphysically necessary. "I could have simply taken 'begins to 
exist' as an undefined primitive in an intuitively true premiss", he writes: 
Well, yes, he could have done that. And if he had, a reader might not 
notice all that Pl commits him to, and this might make it easier to assent to 
Pl. But it seems to me that this is altogether the wrong way for a philoso-
pher to proceed. If one (or more) of the concepts involved in PI is in need 
of analysis, then I believe we should take a look at the analysis and see 
what all it commits us to before pronouncing on just how intuitively clear 
it is that PI must be true. 
Craig is not impressed by this line of argument. When an intuitively 
grasped principle is analyzed, he says, it need not "have the same epis-
temic obviousness of the analysandlml." In any case, there are many differ-
ent degrees of "self-evidence and perspicuity." I have erred, he says, in 
assuming that there is only one. 5 
I do not believe that I did assume that there is only one degree of self-
evidence, nor do I think that my argument requires any such assumption. 
What I do say is that we should ask the following question about PI: "For 
those who have done an accurate analysis, and know what PI commits 
them to, how much of its intuitive luster remains?" If the answer is "none" 
or "very little" or even "much less", then I think a significant doubt has 
been raised about the trustworthiness of the original intuition. 
Just how much muddying of the waters can we tolerate before we give 
up on the "intuition" we started out with? I don't have a general answer to 
this question. But I am at least sure that we need to consider what happens 
to our supposed intuitive certainties when we define our terms. 
2. Is Pl backed by a trustworthy a priori intuition? 
By far the most important of Craig's objections to the argument of my 
paper has to do with the significance of the fact that "beginning to exist" in 
PI must be understood in such a way that it embraces all beginnings, 
whether they are embedded within time or whether they involve the 
Beginning of time itself. Craig thinks there is no significant disanalogy 
here at all: "If the universe could not come into existence uncaused at t, 
where t is preceded by earlier moments of time, why think that if we were 
to annihilate all moments earlier than t, then the universe could come into 
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existence uncaused at t ?"6 
I confess that I do not have any very clear intuitions about this when I 
consider the matter wholly in the abstract, without any concern for what it 
is that is supposed to be happening at the various times. I strongly suspect 
I am not alone in this, and that this is why Craig finds it useful to ask his 
readers to imagine tigers and such "springing into existence uncaused" in 
order to stimulate their "intuitions." 
But suppose it is agreed that, all other things being equal, if the goings on 
at a time t need a cause when there are prior moments, then they would 
still need a cause if there were no prior moments. What follows from that? 
Very little of interest, it seems to me. The problem is that in the real world, 
all other things are not equal. The First Moment in the history of our uni-
verse is unlike all others because that is when the whole natural order 
comes into being. Later moments are embedded not only within time, but, 
more importantly, within a natural order that did not exist prior to the First 
Moment. 
To see why I think this matters, it will be useful to back up a bit and 
look at the way in which Craig tries to elicit the intuition that PI is true. 
For example, he asks, "Does anyone in his right mind believe that, say, a 
raging tiger could suddenly come into existence uncaused, out of nothing, 
in this room right now F Probably no one does. Craig then invites us to 
apply this "intuition" to the beginning of the universe, and the case for PI 
is about as complete as Craig ever makes it. 
But surely this is much too quick? Of course, no one thinks a tiger could 
just spring into existence "in this room right now." But before we jump to 
conclusions, we need to ask why this is so. What is it that makes it so obvi-
ous? Is it, as Craig seems to suppose, that all normal persons possess a 
clear a priori intuition of PI, which they then apply to the case of the tiger? 
Call that the top-down explanation. Or is it rather that all normal persons 
have a lot of experience of animals (and other middle-sized material 
objects), and they know that popping up like that is just not the way such 
things come into existence? Call that the bottom-up explanation. 
The bottom-up explanation takes note of the fact that we are dealing 
with a familiar context - one provided by our collective experience of the 
world in which we live and of the way it operates. It is our background 
knowledge of that context - our empirical knowledge of the natural order 
- that makes it so preposterous to suppose that a tiger might pop into exis-
tence uncaused. We know where tigers and such come from, and that just 
isn't the way they come into existence. 
Now contrast the situation with regard to the First Beginning. There 
simply is no familiar law-governed context for it, precisely because there is 
nothing (read, "there is not anything") prior to the Beginning. We have no 
experience of the origin of worlds to tell us that worlds don't come into exis-
tence like that. We don't even have experience of the coming into being of 
anything remotely analogous to the "initial singularity" that figures in the 
Big Bang theory of the origin of the universe. That is why the absurdity of 
tigers and the like popping into existence out of nowhere tells us nothing 
about the utterly unique case of the Beginning of the whole natural order. 
But what if the very first thing that happened had been a tiger springing 
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into existence? Wouldn't that (still) have been absurd? I have two things 
to say about this: 
(1) Even if a tiger could not be the very first thing in an wlcaused wUverse, 
it does not follow that nothing could be. The apparent absurdity of a tiger 
popping into existence at the very first moment of time derives from our 
knowledge of the natural order that has now come into being (including, per-
haps, our knowledge of the natural kind, "tiger"). It is highly unlikely (per-
haps even impossible) that a world very much like ours could have begun in 
any such fashion as that. We simply know too much about what it takes to 
make a tiger to take such a possibility seriously. But this tells us nothing 
about the "initial singularity" that supposedly marks the beginning of the 
wliverse. 
(2) At the level of raw intuition, I don't see that it is any less absurd to 
suppose that a "timeless agent" started things off by creating a raging tiger 
ex nihilo. But this is a "metaphysical possibility" that Craig presumably 
accepts. (I'll say more about the relevance of our intuitions about creation 
ex nihilo in a bit.) 
Craig is close to a correct understanding of my position when he says: 
"Perhaps Morriston's difficulty is that he thinks of the causal principle as 
akin to a law of nature, like Boyle's Law or the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics, which hold only within our wUverse."B This is almost, 
but not quite, right. Almost right, because I am here thinking of causation 
and causal laws largely in terms of intra-temporal processes and regularities. 
Not quite right, because, subject to further enlightenment, I do not acknowl-
edge the metaphysical necessity of any completely general causal principle. 
Craig continues his attack: "Morriston has given no good reason for 
construing such claims as merely physical rather than as metaphysical 
claims. "9 But why not construe them my way? Craig simply assumes that 
his must be the default position. I find this puzzling. After all, it is Craig 
who is making the really bold claim here. Despite our ability consistently 
to conceive of its falsehood, he insists that PI is true in all possible worlds. 
In defense of this strong claim, Craig says that it is intuitively obvious that 
tigers and such cannot spring into existence without a cause. But T have 
offered a likely explanation of this "intuition" - one that does not commit 
us to a sweeping claim about all possible worlds or even about the begin-
ning of our wUverse. What more do I need to do? 
Quite a lot, apparently. Forget about tigers springing into existence 
uncaused within time. Craig thinks it is, if anything, even more obvious that 
the wUverse (and time) could not have come into existence uncaused. His 
reason seems to be that prior to the beginning of an uncaused universe, 
there would be absolutely nothing. Immediately following the tiger pas-
sage quoted above, he writes, "If prior to the existence of the universe, there 
was absolutely nothing - no God, no space, no time - how could the wU-
verse possibly come to exist?lO Elsewhere he writes, "the first premise of the 
kalam cosmological argument expresses the intuition ex nihilo nihil jit, which 
is so perspicuous that only an effete skepticism can deny it."ll And in his 
reply to my paper he again falls back on this same medieval slogan: "Being 
does not arise from non-being; something cannot come from nothing."12 
But that is exactly the move I thought I had decisively refuted in the sec-
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tion of my paper titled, "Could something come from nothing?"13 What is 
this "nothing", anyway, and how could it provide any sort of context at all 
- much less one that would make it impossible for things to spring into 
existence? Either Craig's claim that nothing comes from nothing says some-
thing analytic and trivial ("if there were nothing at all, then there would 
indeed be nothing at all - not even a springing into existence"), or it mis-
takenly represents the "nothing" from which an uncaused universe must 
"spring" as somehow "existing" prior to the existence of anything (and 
then asserts the impossibility of anything "springing" from that), or, more 
likely, it is just a confusing way of reaffirming the metaphysical necessity 
of Pl. However it is interpreted, this ambiguous formulation provides no 
support whatever for PI. It is surprising, therefore, that Craig continues to 
rely on it without coming to grips with my objection. 
But the confusion surrounding this slogan is not the only thing driving 
Craig's intuition here. He also suggests that there is something about the 
very nature of time that supports his claim that the First Moment is no dif-
ferent from any other. Time, he believes, involves the ever-repeated coming 
into being of something absolutely new. In this respect all moments -
including the very first one - are alike. "[G]iven a dynamic or tensed view 
of time", he says, "every moment of time is a fresh beginning, qualitatively 
indistinguishable from a first moment of time, for when any moment is 
present, earlier moments have passed away and do not exist. Thus, if the 
universe could exist uncaused at a first moment of time, it could exist 
uncaused at any moment of time."14 
Craig's claim that "when any moment is present, earlier moments have 
passed away and do not exist" must be a slip, given his insistence on the 
finitude of the past. At a First Moment there could be no "earlier 
moments" that have "passed away." In that respect, at least, even Craig 
must concede that the First Moment is different. 
But presumably it is the similarity of the First Moment to all others that 
Craig wants to stress here. Each moment is a "fresh beginning." So each is 
(equally) in need of cause. But even if one accepts Craig's "presentist" 
account of time (as many philosophers do not), the premise of this argu-
ment provides no support for its conclusion. Why should we suppose that 
every "fresh beginning" must have a cause? As far as I can see, that is just 
a restatement of Pl. 
More importantly, the argument fails to take into account the important 
ways in which the First Moment differs from later ones. It differs with 
regard both to content (what happened at that moment) and with regard to 
its position within the context of the whole natural order. Some of these 
differences may be relevant to the need for a cause. Whether the First 
Moment requires a cause may depend on just what the universe consists of 
at that moment. Is it the sort of thing that falls under some known or 
knowable regularity? Or is it absolutely unique and without parallel? 
Craig's argument does nothing to show that such differences as these are 
irrelevant to the need for a cause. 
The only time-related intuition I can think of that is in any way relevant 
to the kalam argument is one that is anything but helpful to the case Craig 
wants to make. Some people have quite a strong resistance to the whole 
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idea of a First Moment. The idea of a time prior to which there was no 
time - of an event before which there were no others - strikes them as pro-
foundly counter-intuitive. Even when they try to imagine a "timeless per-
son" somehow producing the first event, a powerful sense of absurdity 
may remain. "But where did it come from? What was there before it hap-
pened?" At the level of raw intuition, "nothing at all" and "there was no 
before, before the beginning" do not "feel" to them like acceptable answers. 
This intuition mayor may not be trustworthy, and it mayor may not 
have been defeated by Craig's philosophical arguments against the infinite 
past'5; but I think it is clear that many people have it, and I suspect that this, 
rather than any special intuition about what does or doesn't need a cause, 
is what some of them really have in mind when they join in the refrain, 
"from nothing, nothing comes." Indeed, this may help explain why Craig 
himself so often equates the denial of PI with the incoherent suggestion 
that a Nothingness "preceded" the universe. Phrases like "if there were 
originally absolute nothingness" and liif prior to the existence of the uni-
verse, there was absolutely nothing" appear so frequently in Craig's 
defense of PI, that it can hardly be accidental. It is almost as if he himself 
subconsciously assumes that every moment of time comes from a previous 
one, so that an uncaused universe could only have come from a prior 
Nothing. 16 
3. What about the "intuition" that creation ex nihilo is impossible? 
In my paper, I suggested that the lack of a "material" cause is at least as 
counter-intuitive as the lack of an "efficient" cause. Craig's response is 
interesting. There are, he says, just three possibilities with respect to the 
origin of the universe: "the infinitude of the past, creation ex nihilo, [and] 
spontaneous origination ex nihilo." Assuming (as we have agreed to do for 
the sake of argument) that Craig's philosophical arguments against the 
infinite past are sound, we must choose between creation ex nihilo and 
uncaused origination ex nihilo. Craig says he prefers the creation hypothe-
sis, since it involves only one counter-intuitive element, whereas the spon-
taneous origination hypothesis "is doubly counter-intuitive in that it 
denies of the universe both a material and (especially) an efficient cause."17 
This seems to me rather to miss the point I was trying to make. I 
brought up the intuitive absurdity of creation ex nihilo only in order to sug-
gest that our intuitions about such matters may not be especially reliable. 
The fact that Craig himself is forced to take a position that runs counter to 
one of his own strong intuitions merely reinforces this point. It should 
make us wonder just how much weight such intuitions can bear. 
In any case, there is a serious gap in Craig's argument for creation ex 
nihilo, since the trilemma - either the infinite past, or creation ex nihilo, or 
spontaneous origination ex nihilo - fails to exhaust the logical alternatives. 
There is at least one other possibility that Craig fails to consider - viz., that 
God made the world out of something-or-other that is (or "wasil) eternal. 
I confess that I do not have a candidate for material cause of the uni-
verse. Craig may be right in suggesting that it could not be our physical 
matter or energy, since they are temporal in nature.H! And we don't seem 
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to be acquainted with any other eternal "stuffs" out of which God might 
have made the universe. But that shouldn't stop Craig. We don't 
encounter any eternal persons either, but he thinks his commitment to PI 
forces him to postulate one. Why, then, does he not simply conclude that 
there must be an eternal material cause, on the ground that he can thereby 
avoid, not only the "double absurdity" of spontaneous generation, but also 
the "single absurdity" of creation ex nihilo? 
Better yet, why not simply admit that we don't have enough to go on to 
make any very certain pronouncements on the matter? That "our line is 
too short to fathom such immense abysses?ff19 
4. Is there a good empirical case for the metaphysical necessity of Pl? 
Even if you are one of those unlucky (or stubborn) persons who lack the 
a priori intuition that PI must be true, Craig thinks you needn't go without 
this truth. For PI is also (he supposes) the conclusion of a sound empirical 
generalization. 
I am not sure precisely how the empirical argument for PI is supposed 
to go. Is it a simple enumerative induction in which we draw a general 
conclusion about all beginnings whatsoever, on the basis of those observed 
beginnings for which there are known causes? And how, exactly, is the 
empirical argument supposed to support Craig's claim that PI is meta-
physically necessary? There are at least three different problems here. 
(1) The class of observed cases may, for all we know, be an unrepresen-
tative sample of the whole territory about which Craig wants to generalize. 
One reason why this is so is that all the comings-to-be that fall under our 
observation are comings-to-be within time, whereas the beginning of the 
universe is (also) the coming-to-be of time - and, I would now want to 
stress, of the whole natural order. For the reasons given above, I do not 
think Craig has succeeded in showing that this difference is unimportant. 
(2) But even if we had a sound generalization about all beginnings in the 
actual world, how could we draw a conclusion about what is true in all pos-
sible worlds? 
Craig doesn't see a problem here. He points out that many philoso-
phers have come to recognize a large class of metaphysically necessary 
truths for which the evidence is empirical. Water is H20. The atomic 
number of gold is 79. And so on. "It could well be", Craig concludes, 
"that only logically posterior to our experience of reality do we inhlitively 
grasp the necessary truth of the causal principle."20 
If Craig wants us to take seriously the idea that we can somehow "intu-
it" the metaphysical necessity of PI in the wake of an empirical identifica-
tion of the sort that is involved in showing that water is H20, he needs to 
explain in some detail how this is supposed to work. A bit of hand-waving 
in the direction of the a posteriori necessities allegedly discovered by Kripke 
and Putnam will not do the trick. 
So how does empirical evidence establish (e.g.) that water is necessarily 
H20? It works somethiI,g like this. We have already decided that water 
(whatever it is) is a natural kind. We are, to use Kripke's expression, already 
rigidly referring to that natural kind (whatever it is) when we use the word 
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"water." But we don't yet know what the nature of that kind is, and we 
need the empirical scientists to get out their instruments, do the appropriate 
chemical analysis, and identify it for us. Once they have done their job, we 
know what water is, and we can then go on to make the claim that anything 
lacking that chemical structure would not be the same kind of stuff. 
Plainly, this type of empirical support is not available for P2. In the first 
place, none of the terms involved in PI ("cause", "thing", "beginning to 
exist") refers to a natural kind that might be identified by the empirical sci-
ences. In the second place, the concepts that make the scientific identifica-
tions possible contain a crucial indexical element. Only if we refer (rigidly) 
to that stuff can we ask the empirical sciences to identify it for us. Since the 
concepts involved in PI lack this indexical element, it is hard to see what 
there is here for the empirical sciences to "identify." 
Craig may say that the examples of scientific identifications should not 
be taken so literally. But then how are we to take them? How are they 
even relevant to the issue under discussion? 
(3) The third problem for Craig's claim that there is a strong empirical 
argument for PI is that there are many other equally well-attested "empiri-
cal" generalizations about causes and effects - ones that Craig would not 
want to accept because they are incompatible with the requirements of the 
kalam argument. In addition to the examples mentioned in my paper, con-
sider the following one. 
(TC) At least part of the total cause of every event precedes it in 
time. 
Even if one grants (as many philosophers do not) that some (partial) 
causes are simultaneous with their effects, those causes are themselves 
states of other things that pre-exist the effects in question. Suppose, to bor-
row a well-worn illustration from Kant, that one thinks the pressure of a 
man's posterior on a cushion is simultaneous with the depression in that 
cushion. The pressure is due to the position and posture of the man's 
body, and this in tum is a state of something - the man's body - that exist-
ed before it was in that state. The total cause thus includes something - the 
man's body - that existed prior to the depression in the cushion. 
(TC) has at least as much going for it as Pl. Indeed, I have been unable 
to think of any counter-examples to it. But (TC), combined with PI, would 
make it impossible to sustain Craig's claim that there is a very first event 
and a very first moment of time. It seems, then, that Craig must reject (TC) 
in spite of its overwhelming (in excelsis, as Craig might say) empirical con-
firmation. 
Now Craig may say that the strong empirical case for (TC) is "simply 
overridden" by his a priori arguments against the infinite past when they 
are taken together with PI. If every beginning has a cause, and there is no 
time prior to the beginning of the universe, then (TC) is false. But even if 
Craig's arguments against the infinite past are better than I think they are, 
this is quite a dangerous line for him to take. For the critic can make pre-
cisely the same move, arguing the PI is "simply overridden" by the same 
arguments when they are taken together with (TC). 
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But this is not all. In my experience, enumerative inductions that satisfy 
the canons of inductive logic do not run afoul of truths that are known a 
priori. If an inductive argument were incompatible with some truth that I 
believed myself to know a priori, I would expect something else to be 
wrong with it. 
So where, exactly, does the empirical case for (TC) go wrong? Will 
Craig now be willing to say that the sample of observed cases is unrepre-
sentative of the whole class about which we are being asked to generalize? 
That what goes for causes and effects embedded with ill time need not 
apply to the Beginning of Everything? Presumably not. But what else is 
there for him to say? 
5. The "conviction of mankind? " 
I had asked how Craig can explain the fact that so many intelligent, 
well-informed philosophers, having looked into the matter and made the 
relevant distinctions, have doubts about the metaphysical necessity of Pl. 
If it is so blindingly obvious, why don't they "get it?" This seemed rele-
vant to me because one of my proposed standards for a trustworthy a priori 
intuition was that someone who carefully considers all that it involves, 
ought to "see" that it is true. 
As nearly as I can tell, Craig does sometimes propose a kind of explana-
tion. He thinks that at least some of those who don't "see" it are simply 
trying to avoid the commitment to theism that he believes falls out of Pl.'! 
In his reply to my paper, Craig does not defend his remarks on the intellec-
tual dishonesty of unbelievers. He takes the point up in a rather different 
way. "The shoe is on the other foot", he says. "If there is any explaining to 
be done", he says, "it falls to Morriston to explain why his little band of 
skeptics fail to see what the vast majority of people, both philosophers and 
non-philosophers, do claim to see and to explain how the bulk of mankind, 
in his view, can be so deceived."22 Later on, Craig refers to PI as "the con-
viction of mankind."" 
But what is it that "the bulk of mankind" are supposed to agree in "see-
ing?" It is no doubt true that heads generally nod when someone says, 
"Nothing comes from nothing," or, "Nothing begins to be without a 
cause." But that isn't to the point. What we need to know is whether 
heads continue to nod when careful distinctions are made. Do they contin-
ue to nod when the sheer oddity of a First Moment is brought into the pic-
ture? When we step back from the natural order within which the demand 
for a cause has its ordinary meaning?" 
It is easy enough to see how Craig's principle - or rather, the words in 
which that principle is expressed - can come to have a sort of intuitive 
sheen for many people. For some, this may be due to their failure to pay 
attention to just what PI commits them to. They may think they have to 
believe that every beginning must have a cause because tigers and such 
don't spring into existence without (natural) causes. They may have failed 
to notice the lack of a natural context for the First Beginning, and the gulf 
that lies between familiar intra-temporal beginnings and the Beginning of 
the natural order, including time itself. Others may believe PI because it is 
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entailed by a stronger principle - the Principle of Sufficient Reason, for 
example - which seems intuitively obvious to them. Still others may be 
confused by obscure slogans like "from nothing, nothing comes." They 
may even think they believe PI, when what they really believe in their heart 
of hearts is that there could not have been a very first moment of time. 
The sources of confusion are legion, and even physicists may not be 
exempt from them when they form "intuitions" about matters that lie out-
side their special expertise.'" But when all the pertinent distinctions are 
made, 1 believe that many (I do not say all) intelligent, well-informed, and 
honest people will have reasonable doubts about the metaphysical necessi-
ty of PI, and I see no reason to credit the "intuitions" of those who have 
not so much as considered the issues I have raised. Here, as elsewhere, 
"the slow and deliberate steps of philosophers" must be distinguished 
from "the precipitate march of the vulgar."26 27 
University of Colorado, Boulder 
NOTES 
1. William Craig, "Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Cause?: A 
Rejoinder," Faith and Philosophy, 18, no. 1 (January 2002), 94-105. See also Wes 
Morriston, "Must the Beginnillg of the Universe Have a Personal Cause?" Faith 
and Philosophy, 17, no 2 (April 2000), 149-169. 
2. Craig also claims that the kalam argument would not be "even ostensi-
bly defeated" by the argument of my paper. Even if were not backed up by a 
legitimate a priori intuition or by a strong empirical argument, Craig feels sure 
that PI would still be at least "more plausible" than its denial. And that, he 
supposes, is all that is required for a "successful piece of natural theology." 
(Rejoinder, 97) I find this claim difficult to interpret. What does Craig have in 
mind when he says that PI is "more plausible" than its contradictory? Is it that 
many people find it to be more plausible·) If so, we must ask why they find it to 
be so. Without a proper account of what makes a proposition plausible, I see no 
reason to give mere subjective feelings of plausibility any episternic weight. 
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